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Abstract
We study ﬁrm investment in abatement technology under a linear-demand and het-
erogeneous ﬁrm framework. In contrast to results in existing studies, our ﬁndings indi-
cate that ﬁrms’ investments in advanced abatement technology exhibit an inverted-U-shape
with respect to ﬁrms’ productivity. In response to tightened environmental regulations,
more-productive ﬁrms raise their respective investments in abatement technology, whereas
less-productive ﬁrms do the opposite; Pollution emission intensity of a ﬁrm decreases with
productivity level. The key theoretical predictions are conﬁrmed by empirical tests using
Chinese data.
Keywords: Pollution; heterogenous ﬁrms; abatement technology; emission intensity; China
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1 Introduction
People have become increasingly more concerned about the environment. To understand the
pattern and impacts of pollution, researchers have largely undertaken studies at the country and
industry levels. However, as ﬁrms are pollution generators, related issues must be examined at
the ﬁrm level. Traditional studies of environmental economics work with models that assume
representative ﬁrm. This is at odds with reality as in reality ﬁrms are diﬀerent in many aspects
and have diﬀerent environmental behaviors. Recent empirical studies have found that larger ﬁrms
or more-productive ﬁrms have lower emission intensity (Shadbegian and Gray, 2003; Forslid et
al., 2011), and larger ﬁrms spend more in environmental protection (Biehl and Klassen, 2008).
The lack of theoretical studies at the ﬁrm level is due to the unavailability of a general
framework that characterizes ﬁrm heterogeneity. The Melitz (2003) model in international trade
can be used to analyze heterogenous ﬁrms’ environmental behaviors. Empirical studies at the
ﬁrm-level are also scarce because of the diﬃculty in obtaining ﬁrm-level environmental data.
The present paper makes a contribution to the literature by exploring issues along these two
directions.
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Recent theoretical studies have focused on heterogeneous ﬁrms’ environmental behavior.
Those studies generally concluded that the pollution emission intensity of a ﬁrm decreases with
respect to its productivity. Some studies also showed that a ﬁrm’s investment in abatement
technology increases with respect to its productivity. The present paper conﬁrms the decreasing
emission intensity result, but shows that ﬁrms’ investments in abatement technology exhibit an
inverted-U-shape with respect to productivity: when productivity is low, an increase in pro-
ductivity raises a ﬁrm’s investment level, but when productivity is high, a further increase in
productivity reduces a ﬁrm’s investment level.
The inverted-U-shaped investment prediction is based on a mix of the Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008) model of heterogeneous ﬁrms and the Copeland and Taylor (2003) model of pollution.
When a ﬁrm is not very productive, an increase in productivity induces it to increase its produc-
tion, which will generate more pollution. It is optimal for the ﬁrm to make a larger investment
in abatement technology. When a ﬁrm is very productive, a further increase in productivity also
induces more production, but at a lower rate of increase, as it is more concerned of the price drop.
With linear demand, although a more-productive ﬁrm always produces more output in equilib-
rium, it may use less inputs and thus generates less pollution, which implies lower investment in
abatement technology. To test our prediction, we introduce the productivity square term as a
regressor in the standard regression model. Our empirical analysis using Chinese ﬁrm-level data
supports the inverted-U-shaped investment pattern.
Our paper makes a number of signiﬁcant contributions to the growing literature on heteroge-
nous ﬁrms and environment. First, all existing theoretical studies use the Melitz (2003) model
from the trade literature to analyze the diﬀerential eﬀects of trade on heterogeneous ﬁrms’ en-
vironmental performance. For example, Bojona and Missio (2010) showed that more-productive
ﬁrms are exporters, and they also have lower emission intensity than less-productive ﬁrms. Cui
(2011) obtained similar results in the presence of the possibility of investment in clean technol-
ogy.1 Although our model is built on Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model, which is also a trade
model, our emphasis is on the relationship between ﬁrm productivity and emission intensity on
the one hand, and that between ﬁrm productivity and investment in abatement technology on
the other hand, abstract from the eﬀect of trade.
Second, few studies have explicitly analyzed investment in abatement technology using the
Copeland and Taylor (2003) cum Melitz (2003) model. Cui (2011) reinterpreted technological
adoption in the Bustos (2011) model as adoption of diﬀerent environmental technology, with clean
technology associated with larger ﬁxed cost and smaller marginal cost than dirty technology. Cui
(2011) showed that high-productivity ﬁrms adopt the clean technology. Forslid et al. (2011) found
that under some parameter restrictions, ﬁrm investment in abatement technology is positively
related to ﬁrm productivity. On the contrary, we show that investment in abatement technology
1Yokoo (2009) also introduced ﬁrm heterogeneity to an environment model, but examined a very diﬀerent
issue: how environmental regulation aﬀects a country’s competitiveness, i.e., the Porter hypothesis. The result is
very simple: tightening regulation drives out less-productive ﬁrms, thereby increasing the average productivity.
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exhibits an inverted-U-shape with respect to ﬁrm productivity. Thus, we must appeal to data
to resolve the diﬀerence. Forslid et al. (2011) found empirical support to their prediction using
Swedish ﬁrm-level data. Similarly we also ﬁnd empirical support to our prediction using Chinese
data. Both works may be correct as these two papers used data from diﬀerent countries. However,
the Swedish data in Forslid et al. (2011) may in fact exhibit an inverted-U-shape had the
productivity square term been introduced in their regression model as was done in our model.2
Third, all existing papers predicted that more-productive ﬁrms have lower emission intensity.
This negative relationship between pollution emission and ﬁrm productivity is conﬁrmed by a
number of empirical studies: Cui (2011) used detailed facility-level data of the US manufacturing
industry in year 2002 and 2005, Forslid et al. (2011) used Swedish ﬁrm-level data, and Shadbegian
and Gray (2003) used US paper mills industry data in 1985.3 Our study also conﬁrms this
relationship using Chinese data.4
Fourth, we examine the eﬀects of environmental policy on ﬁrms’ environmental behavior and
obtain results that diﬀer from those in existing studies. Yokoo (2009) showed that, without
investment in abatement technology, tightening environmental regulation results in resource re-
allocation from less-productive ﬁrms to more-productive ﬁrms. Forslid et al. (2011) predicted
that the incentive to invest in abatement technology will fall for all ﬁrms in response to tighten-
ing environmental regulations. The logic is that as pollution tax goes up, ﬁrms will pollute less.
Thus, the incentive to invest in abatement technology will also fall due to economies of scale. On
the contrary, we ﬁnd that although the scale eﬀect prevails among less-productive ﬁrms, more-
productive ﬁrms will increase their investment in abatement technology in response to a rise in
pollution tax. The reason behind this result is closely linked to the inverted-U-shaped investment
curve. As very productive ﬁrms do not have a large investment in abatement technology, the
marginal cost of raising investment level to reduce pollution is very eﬀective for them.5
The inverted-U shape has been mentioned in many studies of environmental economics. How-
ever, they often refer to phenomena diﬀerent from the present study. Most earlier studies in this
area are about the relationship between a country’s pollution and its economic development.
One interesting exception is the recent paper by Perino and Requate (2012) who examined the
inverted-U shape at the ﬁrm level. However, their focus and results are very diﬀerent from those
of the present paper. First, Perino and Requate (2012) showed that under the social optimum,
2Other empirical observations are subject to similar reinterpretation. Statistics Canada (2006) reported that
larger businesses in Canada spend more (in per employee terms) in environmental protection, and Biehl and
Klassen (2008) showed that within the same industry, larger ﬁrms spend more on pollution abating activities.
3There are a few ﬁrm-level empirical studies in trade literature that compare exporters and non-exporters with
regard to their environmental performance. According to these studies, exporters’ emission intensity is generally
lower than that of non-exporters (e.g., Holladay, 2010).
4Some other studies relate ﬁrm attributes to ﬁrm environmental performance. Zhang et al. (2008) used data
collected from 89 Chinese ﬁrms from a county to show that ﬁrms with larger scale are more active in improving
their environmental management performance, which is measured based on 12 indicators obtained from surveys.
Earnhart and Lizal (2010) used US data based on ﬁrms from chemical manufacturing industry and found that
better managed ﬁrms (measured by return on sales) have higher levels of environmental management.
5There is another strand of literature that is concerned about the opposite direction: the eﬀect of regulation
on productivity (Gray, 1987). For example, Gray and Shadbegian (2003) found that tightened environmental
regulations result in higher abatement cost and, subsequently, lower productivity at the plant level.
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the share of ﬁrms adopting new abatement technology exhibits an inverted-U shape with respect
to the marginal damage of pollution. In contrast, we show that under individual ﬁrms’ optimal
choice, the relationship between a ﬁrm’s investment in advanced abatement technology and the
ﬁrm’s productivity exhibits inverted-U shape. Second, they showed that the relationship between
policy stringency and the rate of technology adoption is inverted U-shaped. In contrast, we show
that in response to a stringent policy, the more productive ﬁrms increases their investment level
while the less eﬃcient ﬁrms reduce their investment level. Third, in their model, all ﬁrms have
the same productivity level, but with diﬀerent costs of adopting the new technology (in the exten-
sion, they allowed ﬁrms to have diﬀerent abatement cost curves). In contrast, our model builds
on the recent ﬁrm heterogeneity literature and assume that ﬁrms have diﬀerent productivity in
production but face the same abatement technology.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2. Sections
3 and 4 contain all the theoretical analyses and equilibrium results. Empirical analyses are
conducted in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Our model introduces pollution and abatement technology (Copeland and Taylor, 2003) to a
heterogeneous-ﬁrms framework a la Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Speciﬁcally, we consider an
economy with N identical consumers and two industries: a homogeneous goods industry and
a diﬀerentiated goods industry. We will treat homogenous goods as the numeraire, with prices
equal to one and perfect competition. Our focus is on the diﬀerentiated goods industry, which is
characterized by monopolistic competition.
2.1 Preference and demand
As in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), we assume that each consumer has the following quasi-linear
form
U = Q0 + α

i∈Ω
qidi− 1
2
β

i∈Ω
qidi
2
− 1
2
γ

i∈Ω
q2i di (1)
where α, β, and γ are positive parameters; Q0 is the consumption of the numeraire; Ω is the set
of all varieties from the diﬀerentiated goods industry; and qi is the consumption of variety i. A
consumer maximizes her utility subject to a budget constraint. As a result, market demand for
variety i from all N consumers is pi = α− βN

j∈Ω qjdj− γN qi. β measures substitutability among
varieties.
Given the monopolistic competition in the diﬀerentiated goods industry, the seller of variety
i regards himself as a monopolist, and competition from all other varieties is totally captured in
the vertical intercept of the demand function. Let M be the measure of Ω (i.e., the total number
of varieties) and P =

i∈Ω pidi be the aggregate price of all varieties. Then, the demand function
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for variety i is
pi = A− bqi (2)
where
A =
αγ + βP
βM + γ
and b =
γ
N
. (3)
The demand slope b is exogenous, but the demand intercept A is endogenous, depending on
both the degree of product substitution (captured by β) and the degree of market competition
(captured by P and M).
2.2 Production and costs
Production of both the homogeneous good and diﬀerentiated goods needs to employ a composite
of inputs which may include labor, capital, and others. The technology for the homogeneous
goods is simple. By choosing units properly, we assume that producing one unit of homogeneous
goods requires one unit of inputs. Hence, input price is also equal to unity. We turn to production
of the diﬀerentiated goods next.
We will consider a short-run version of Melitz-Ottaviano model. Short run indicates a ﬁxed
measure of incumbent ﬁrms and no free entry to the diﬀerentiated goods industry. All ﬁrms draw
their respective productivity parameter ϕ randomly from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. After
observing its productivity level, each ﬁrm decides whether to stay in or leave the market. Each
ﬁrm that chooses to stay produces a distinct variety.
Production of each variety needs a bundle of inputs. Production generates pollution. However,
a standard pollution abatement technology is available to all ﬁrms at no cost. By devoting inputs
to abatement, a ﬁrm can reduce its pollution level. If a ﬁrm with productivity level ϕ employs x
units of inputs and allocates a fraction, θ ∈ [0, 1], to pollution abatement, the amount of inputs
available for production is (1− θ)x. As in Copeland and Taylor (2003), the output of the variety
that the ﬁrm produces is assumed to be
q =

ϕ(1− θ)x. (4)
As a result, a ﬁrm’s actual productivity is endogenously determined where ϕ is its exogenously
given productivity. Moreover, pollution generated from the ﬁrm’s production is z = R (θ)x,
where R (θ) is the standard abatement function that satisﬁes R (0) = 1, R (1) = 0 and R
′
(θ) < 0.
We follow Copeland and Taylor (2003) to assume R (θ) = (1− θ) 1v , where 0 < v < 1. v captures
the eﬀectiveness of the standard abatement technology: a larger v indicates lower eﬃciency as
∂R
∂v
> 0.
Aside from using a fraction of its inputs to reduce pollution, the ﬁrm can also invest in
advanced abatement technology to enhance the eﬃciency of pollution reduction. Let f(k) denote
the advanced abatement technology with investment level k, in terms of units of input bundles.
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Then, the ﬁrm’s total pollution level will be
z = f(k)R (θ)x (5)
where f(k) > 0, f
′
(k) < 0, and f
′′
(k) > 0 . The convexity of f(·) indicates that as investment
increases, its marginal eﬀectiveness goes down. For tractability, we assume f(k) =

1
1+k
 1
v
.
2.3 Environmental regulations
A government can regulate pollution in many ways. It can impose a pollution tax, a pollution
quota, a tax on using pollution-generating inputs, or a quantitative restriction on energy use. In
this paper, we consider pollution tax, τ , imposed on each unit of pollution generated by a ﬁrm.
3 Equilibrium analysis
3.1 Optimal proﬁts
Facing demand (2), production (4) and (5), and environmental regulation τ , a ﬁrm with pro-
ductivity ϕ chooses its total inputs x, the fraction of inputs for abatement θ, and investment in
advanced technology k to maximize its proﬁt. To this end, optimization is conducted by ﬁrst
deriving the optimal proﬁt for any given k, denoted by π(ϕ; k), and then deriving the optimal
investment level.
Using (4) and (5) to eliminate θ, the production function can be written as
q =

ϕ(1 + k)zνx1−ν . (6)
For a given x, choosing the fraction θ is equivalent to choosing the pollution level z. Thus, we
can view output as a result of using both inputs and pollution in the production process. This
production function yields the following cost minimization problem:
min
{x, z}
{τz + x} s.t. ϕ(1 + k)zνx1−ν = q2.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are given by
τ = λϕ(1 + k)νzν−1x1−ν
1 = λϕ(1 + k)(1− ν)zνx−ν ,
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier. From these two equations we obtain
z
x
=
ν
1− ν
1
τ
. (7)
The equation above is the pollution-to-input ratio, which is independent of the productivity level.
With higher pollution tax, every ﬁrm allocates a larger fraction of inputs to pollution abatement
6
to reduce pollution. This ratio increases with v, meaning that pollution-to-input ratio is higher
with a less eﬀective abatement technology. Using this result in ϕ(1 + k)zνx1−ν = q2, we can
solve for the optimal z and x as below
x =

1− ν
ν
τ
ν
q2
ϕ(1 + k)
, z =

1− ν
ν
τ
ν−1
q2
ϕ(1 + k)
.
Hence, the minimum cost function for a given k is
C (q;ϕ, k) =
ρ
ϕ(1 + k)
q2,
where
ρ =
τν
νν (1− ν)1−ν ,
which increases with the pollution tax rate.
The ﬁrm chooses q to maximize its proﬁt (excluding investment cost):
max
q>0
[(A− bq)q −C (q;ϕ, k)].
The ﬁrst-order condition yields the optimal output
q(ϕ; k) =
Aϕ(1 + k)
2[bϕ(1 + k) + ρ]
, (8)
and the optimal price and proﬁt, respectively,
p(ϕ; k) =
bAϕ(1 + k) + 2ρA
2[bϕ(1 + k) + ρ]
, π(ϕ;k) =
A2ϕ(1 + k)
4[bϕ(1 + k) + ρ]
. (9)
3.2 Optimal investment in advanced abatement technology
Based on the previous analysis, we obtain the following optimization problem for k:
max
k
[π(ϕ; k)− k].
From (9), π(ϕ; k) is strictly concave in k. The optimal investment level can be obtained from
the ﬁrst-order condition, which gives
k(ϕ) =

A
√
ρϕ−2ρ
2bϕ − 1 > 0 for all ϕ ∈ (ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗)
0 otherwise,
(10)
where ϕ∗ and ϕ∗∗ are given as
ϕ∗ ≡ ρ
16b2

A−

A2 − 16b
2
and ϕ∗∗ ≡ ρ
16b2

A+

A2 − 16b
2
. (11)
To examine how ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity levels choose their respective investments, we
take the partial derivative of k with respect to productivity ϕ, for ϕ ∈ (ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗), which gives
∂k
∂ϕ
=
4ρ−A√ρϕ
4bϕ2
	
> 0 for all ϕ < 16ρ/A2
< 0 for all ϕ > 16ρ/A2.
(12)
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The analysis leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1. (i) Only ﬁrms with intermediate levels of productivity, ϕ ∈ (ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗), make
positive investments in advanced abatement technology.
(ii). For those ﬁrms that make positive investments, the investment level increases with
productivity level when ϕ < 16ρ
A2
but decreases with productivity level when ϕ > 16ρ
A2
.
Depending on the relative value of ρ and A, there are four representative cases, which are
all depicted in Figure 1. We can understand the inverted-U-shaped investment pattern mainly
through two channels: demand and regulation. Figure 1-1 represents the case in which ϕ∗∗ < 1,
that is, ρ < 16b
2
(A+
√
A2−16b)2
. This condition is more likely to hold for weak market demand (small
A) and weak environmental regulation (small ρ). Two observations are called from the above.
First, ﬁrms with very low or very high productivity do not make any investment in advanced
abatement technology. Second, the positive investment levels shows an inverted-U-shaped curve
with respect to the increase in productivity. Every ﬁrm faces the tradeoﬀ between allocating re-
sources to production to increase output and allocating resources to abatement to reduce payment
of pollution tax. However, the tradeoﬀ works diﬀerently for diﬀerent ﬁrms. Generally, a scale
eﬀect is observed, whereby it is optimal to invest more in abatement technology when pollution is
high. Least-productive ﬁrms do not use plenty of inputs in their production anyway and so do not
generate much pollution. Thus, investing in advanced abatement technology is not worthwhile.
For medium-productive ﬁrms, those with higher productivity produce more, hire more inputs,
and generate more pollution. Investing more in advanced abatement technology is worthwhile.
However, among high-productive ﬁrms, those with even higher productivity, although producing
more, hire less inputs and generate relatively less pollution. Naturally, they have lower levels of
investment in advanced abatement technology. For extremely-productive ﬁrms, they no longer
hire plenty of inputs any more, and consequently, they do not generate much pollution, which
suggests that they have zero investment in advanced abatement technology.
Figure 1-2 represents the case in which ϕ∗∗ > 1 and 16ρ
A2
< 1, which together imply ρ ∈
16b2
(A+
√
A2−16b)2
, A
2
16

. Compared with the previous case, market demand is stronger in this case,
and environmental regulation is tougher. With stronger demand, all ﬁrms produce more than in
the previous case. Even the most eﬃcient ﬁrms (ϕ = 1) also hire a large quantity of inputs. As a
large amount of inputs generates much pollution, the optimal decision for the most eﬃcient ﬁrms
is to render positive investment in advanced abatement technology. With tougher environmental
regulation, ﬁrms are more concerned about pollution tax, and thus, investment in abatement
technology. Nevertheless, the inverted-U-shape in investments still appears.
Figure 1-3 represents the case in which ϕ∗ < 1 and 16ρ
A2
> 1, which together imply ρ ∈
A2
16 ,
16b2
(A−
√
A2−16b)2

. In this case, demand is weaker, and environmental regulation is tougher
compared with the case in Figure 1-2. Although ﬁrms do not produce as much as that in Figure
8
Figure 1: Optimal Investments
1-2, they need to be concerned more about pollution tax. As such, even the more eﬃcient ﬁrms
do not reduce their investment in advanced abatement technology. The inverted-U-shape does
not appear. Compared with Figure 1-2, Figure 1-3 shows more ﬁrms with zero investment in
abatement technology.
Figure 1-4 represents the case in which ϕ∗ > 1, that is, ρ > 16b
2
(A−
√
A2−16b)2
. As the right-hand
side is an increasing function of A, this condition is more likely to hold with smaller A. This
is the case of weakest demand among all four cases. When demand is very weak, every ﬁrm
produces a small amount, and consequently, does not generate much pollution. This is also the
case with the toughest regulation, which induces all ﬁrms to allocate more inputs to pollution
abatement, resulting in low level of pollution (see (7)). Thus, investing in abatement technology
is not worthwhile.
Proposition 1 establishes the inverted-U-shape result, which contradicts existing results in
studies such as Forslid et al. (2011), who predicted that the level of abatement investment is an
increasing function of productivity. Two possible reasons may explain the diﬀerence: diﬀerent
approaches to modelling pollution and diﬀerent demand structure. First, pollution generated by
ﬁrms can be modeled through two approaches. One approach assumes that a ﬁrm’s pollution
emission is proportional to the amount of input it uses, called the input-pollution approach. The
other approach assumes that a ﬁrm’s pollution emission is proportional to the output the ﬁrm
produces, hence called the output-pollution approach. Most existing studies on environment
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and heterogeneous ﬁrms, including Forslid et al. (2011), use the output-pollution approach.
By contrast, like Copeland and Taylor (2003), we use the input-pollution approach. In the
representative ﬁrm model, as that in Copeland and Taylor (2003), these two approaches are
mathematically equivalent and do not produce qualitatively and economically diﬀerent results.
They could be diﬀerent, mathematically and economically, in the heterogeneous ﬁrm model,
however. The key question is whether our inverted-U-shape result can only be obtained under
the input-pollution approach. This is a legitimate question as in the input-pollution approach,
more-eﬃcient ﬁrms may need less inputs, which may result in lower pollution and hence lower
investment in advanced abatement technology. In checking whether Proposition 1 may still hold
should the output-pollution approach be used, the eﬀect of the following modiﬁcation to our
model must be examined: z = R (θ)ϕx, in which ϕx represents output rather than input as this
term includes the productivity level. Repeating the analysis before, we can obtain the optimal
output as q =

ϕ1−v(1 + k)x1−vzv. After the transformation Φ = ϕ1−v, where Φ is viewed
as ﬁrms’ productivity parameter, we have q =

Φ(1 + k)x1−vzv, which is the same as (6) in
functional form. Thus, all the analyses are on track. Hence, we will still have the inverted-U-
shaped investment in abatement technology with the turning point at Φ = 16ρ
A2
or ϕ =


16ρ
A2
 1
1−v .
Our new result diﬀers from the existing studies not because of the diﬀerent approaches to the
modeling of pollution generation.
We now turn to the second possible reason, which is about demand structure. Forslid et al.
(2011) used the Melitz (2003) model, which has CES preference and constant markup. In such
a model, a more-productive ﬁrm always employs more inputs, which implies larger investment
in advanced abatement technology. In contrast, we adopt the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
framework of linear demand. With linear demand, although a more-productive ﬁrm always
produces more output in equilibrium, it may use less inputs and thus generates less pollution,
which implies lower investment in abatement technology. This diﬀerence explains the diﬀerent
results between our paper and prior ones.
3.3 Pollution emission and resource allocation
We now explore other outcomes of the model. Our ﬁrst question is how ﬁrms diﬀer in allocating
the fraction of their inputs to pollution abatement. From (5), we obtain
θ = 1−
 z
x
ν
(1 + k). (13)
From (7), the ratio z
x
is constant across all ﬁrms and independent of k. Thus, ∂θ
∂ϕ
= − ∂k
∂ϕ
, and
with Proposition 1, we immediately establish the following property:
Proposition 2. (i) All ﬁrms with ϕ < ϕ∗ or ϕ > ϕ∗∗ have the same fraction of inputs devoted
to pollution abatement.
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(ii). For those ﬁrms with ϕ ∈ (ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗), the fraction of inputs devoted to pollution abatement
decreases with productivity level if ϕ < 16ρ
A2
but increases with productivity level if ϕ > 16ρ
A2
.
As indicated by (13), substitution occurs between θ and k, which is easy to understand.
If a ﬁrm decides to allocate a larger fraction of its inputs to pollution abatement, pollution
emission will be reduced. As such, a larger investment to improve the abatement technology is
not desirable. Similarly, if a ﬁrm has made a large investment on abatement technology, it will
need to worry less about the total emission generated from its production, thereby leaving more
inputs for production is optimal. Following the property of k as presented in Proposition 1, this
substitution makes it easy to understand the opposite changes in θ and k with respect to a change
in productivity. For less-productive ﬁrms, that is, ϕ < 16ρ
A2
, those with higher productivity invest
more in advanced abatement technology, which in turn allows theme to allocate a smaller fraction
of inputs to abatement and leave more to production, without generating too much pollution. By
contrast, for more-productive ﬁrms, that is, ϕ > 16ρ
A2
, those with higher productivity invest less
on advanced abatement technology, which in turn will require them to allocate a larger fraction
of inputs to pollution abatement.
Our second question is about a ﬁrm’s emission intensity, which is deﬁned as the total emission
divided by total output. This is a common measure of environmental performance. Let e denote
the emission intensity, then e = z
q
. We can prove the following proposition (see Appendix):
Proposition 3. A more-productive ﬁrm has a lower emission intensity: ∂e
∂ϕ
< 0.
In the proof of Proposition 3, we also show that ∂q
∂ϕ
> 0, that is, more-productive ﬁrms
produce more output. Among the ﬁrms making positive investment in abatement technologies,
we can also prove (i) ∂z
∂ϕ
> 0 for low-productivity ﬁrms, and (ii) under some conditions, ∂z
∂ϕ
< 0
for the high-productivity ﬁrms. Thus, the monotonicity of q(ϕ) contributes to the decrease in
emission intensity, but it is not the only reason. The ﬁrm’s emission level may actually drops
as its productivity increases, and even if the emission level goes up, the rate of increase is lower
than that of the increase in output.
3.4 General equilibrium
The above analyses are partial equilibrium analyses as they are carried out for any given A. We
now derive the equilibrium A, which, together with the previous analyses, will constitute the
general equilibrium.
Using the optimal k(ϕ) in (9), we obtain the following individual prices:
p(ϕ) =

A
2 +
√
ρ√
ϕ
if ϕ ∈ (ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗)
A(bϕ+2ρ)
2(bϕ+ρ) otherwise.
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We next calculate the aggregate price based on these individual prices. No ﬁrm exits the market
as there is no ﬁxed cost of production; thus, M = 1. As the individual prices take two forms,
depending on the range of productivity level, we need to analyze the aggregate price in various
cases respectively.
First, suppose that ϕ∗ ≤ 1 but ϕ∗∗ ≥ 1. Then, the aggregate price is
P =
 ϕ∗
0
A(bϕ+ 2ρ)
2 (bϕ+ ρ)
dϕ+
 1
ϕ∗

A
2
+
√
ρ√
ϕ

dϕ =
A
2

1 +
ρ
b
ln
bϕ∗ + ρ
ρ

+ 2
√
ρ(1−√ϕ∗).
The above condition, together with the expression of A given in (3) and that of ϕ∗ given in (11),
determines the equilibrium A. We can prove the existence of equilibrium A such that ϕ∗ ≤ 1 but
ϕ∗∗ ≥ 1. For this equilibrium to exist, γ must be suﬃciently small.6
Second, suppose that ϕ∗∗ < 1. Then, the aggregate price is
P =

[0,ϕ∗]∪[ϕ∗∗,1]
A(bϕ+ 2ρ)
2 (bϕ+ ρ)
dϕ+
 ϕ∗∗
ϕ∗

A
2
+
√
ρ√
ϕ

dϕ
=
A
2

1 +
ρ
b
ln
(bϕ∗ + ρ) (b+ ρ)
(bϕ∗∗ + ρ) ρ

+ 2
√
ρ(
√
ϕ∗∗ −√ϕ∗).
The above condition, together with the expression of A given in (3) and those of ϕ∗ and ϕ∗∗
given in (11), determines the equilibrium A. We can prove the existence of equilibrium A, under
which ϕ∗∗ < 1. For this equilibrium to exist, α > 2
β


β2 + γ2

and ρ must be suﬃciently small.7
Third, suppose that ϕ∗ > 1. Then, the aggregate price is
P =
 1
0
A(bϕ+ 2ρ)
2 (bϕ+ ρ)
dϕ =
A
2

1 +
ρ
b
ln
b+ ρ
ρ

.
The above condition, together with the expression of A given in (3), determines the equilibrium
A, which is A = 2αγ/

β

1− ρ
b
ln b+ρ
ρ

+ 2γ

.
4 Eﬀects of environmental policies
In this subsection, we examine ﬁrms’ investment in advanced abatement technology in response to
changes in environmental policies. The type of environmental policy we focus on is the pollution
tax. ρ is an increasing function of τ . From (10), we observe that τ aﬀects k through ρ only, and
sign


∂k
∂τ

= sign

∂k
∂ρ

because ∂ρ
∂τ
> 0. Furthermore,
∂k
∂ρ
=
A
4

ϕ
ρ
− 1 +
√
ρϕ
2
√
r
· ∂A
∂ρ
bϕ
(14)
for those ﬁrms that make positive investment in advanced abatement technology. As we cannot
obtain the closed form solution for the equilibrium A (except in the case of ϕ∗ > 1, which is less
6The proof is quite lengthy. It is available upon request from the authors.
7The proof is quite lengthy. It is available upon request from the authors.
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interesting), let us ﬁrst examine the equilibrium eﬀects of changing pollution tax by treating A
as constant. We will return later to discuss the possible change when the general equilibrium
eﬀect is taken into consideration. Assuming ∂A
∂ρ
= 0 for the moment, we immediately know that
∂k
∂ρ
> 0 if and only if ϕ > 16ρ
A2
, which is just the turning point of the productivity level for the
inverted-U-shaped investment curve. Hence, we establish the following result.
Proposition 4. Suppose that 16ρ
A2
< 1 in equilibrium. Then, an increase in pollution tax results in
contrasting responses from the ﬁrms: more-productive ﬁrms (ϕ > 16ρ
A2
) raise their investment in
advanced abetment technology, whereas less-productive ones (ϕ < 16ρ
A2
) reduce their investments.
The proposition applies to the range of ﬁrms that make positive investment before the tax
increase. For ﬁrms at the margins between investing or not investing before the tax increase, we
can obtain ∂ϕ
∗∗
∂ρ
> 0 and ∂ϕ
∗
∂ρ
> 0. That is, low-productivity marginal ﬁrms (i.e., those just above
the critical level ϕ∗) switch from making positive investment to making zero investment when
pollution tax increases. By contrast, high-productivity marginal ﬁrms (i.e., those just above the
critical level ϕ∗∗) switch from making zero investment to making positive investment in response
to pollution tax increases. The intuition is as follows. In response to an increase in pollution tax,
a ﬁrm can do two things. On the one hand, the ﬁrm can reallocate more input from production
to pollution reduction. On the other hand, it can increase investment in abatement technology
to reduce the existing level of pollution. The proposition shows that less-eﬃcient ﬁrms prefer
using the former method to reduce pollution, and as a result, they correspondingly reduce their
abatement-technology investment level to save cost, whereas more-eﬃcient ﬁrms ﬁnd the latter
approach more proﬁtable. The key reason is that reallocating one unit of input from production
to pollution reduction hurts the more-eﬃcient ﬁrms’ proﬁts more compared with the less-eﬃcient
ﬁrms’ proﬁts due to their diﬀerence in production eﬃciency.
Forslid et al. (2011) predicted that the incentive to invest in abatement technology will
fall for all ﬁrms as pollution cost increases. As pollution tax goes up, ﬁrms will pollute less,
which reduces their incentive to invest in abatement technology (the scale eﬀect). Our prediction
is diﬀerent with regard to high-productivity ﬁrms. In Forslid et al. (2011), high-productive
ﬁrms always generate more pollution than low-productivity ﬁrms and will thus invest more in
abatement technology. By contrast, in our setting, high-productivity ﬁrms do not always have
larger investment. This diﬀerence indicates that the marginal eﬀect of further investment is lower
in their model than in our model, thus, high-productivity ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to increase their
investment in our model but to reduce their investment in the model proposed by Forslid et al.
(2011).
We now turn to the general equilibrium eﬀect by including the indirect eﬀect through A.
From (9), every ﬁrm raises its optimal price in response to the tax increase (holding A constant,
∂p
∂τ
> 0). This move tends to raise A. Thus, ∂A
∂τ
> 0 or ∂A
∂ρ
> 0. From (14), this indirect eﬀect
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raises the value of ∂k
∂ρ
. As long as ∂A
∂ρ
is not too large, we can still have ∂k
∂ρ
< 0 for ϕ suﬃciently
close to ϕ∗, i.e., very low productivity. Then, the qualitative aspect of Proposition 4 is still valid
(with a diﬀerent cut-oﬀ productivity level). Even if ∂k
∂ρ
> 0 for all ϕ, our ﬁnding is still and even
more in contradiction to that of Forslid et al. (2011).
5 Empirical test
We now bring the key theoretical predictions to the data. We will not test all our theoretical
results partly due to data availability and partly due to the theoretical focus of this paper.
5.1 Data
Our empirical analysis uses data drawn from the Energy Saving and Abatement Survey (ESAS),
which covers 800 manufacturing ﬁrms in China for the period between 2005 and 2009. The survey
was conducted jointly by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and Center for China in
the World Economy (CCWE) of Tsinghua University. It contains information about each ﬁrm’s
energy usage, pollutive input usage, input prices, expenditure on abatement technologies, and
others.
In testing Proposition 1, data on abatement technology expenditure are of particular use.
In the data, expenditure consists of investment in process optimization, expenses for the retro-
ﬁtting of old equipment and purchasing of new equipment, and labor costs associated with these
activities. Expenditure is a very good measure of investment in abatement technology upgrading.
We need more information about each ﬁrm’s production and ﬁnancial data in order to measure
ﬁrm productivity. However, such information is not available in the ESAS dataset. Thus, we
turn to the Annual Surveys of Manufacturing Firms in China (ASMF) conducted by the National
Bureau of Statistics of China. This survey includes all ﬁrms with annual sales over RMB 5 million
yuan. It contains detailed accounting information of all the surveyed ﬁrms, which allows us to
estimate ﬁrm productivity. For our empirical analysis, we need to merge the ESAS data with
the ASMF data for the period of 2005 to 2009. The merged dataset consists of a balanced panel
of 800 ﬁrms. Some summary statistics are reported in Table 1. On average, each ﬁrm spends
RMB 6.6 million on abatement technology per year. This amount is signiﬁcant given the total
ﬁxed assets of an average ﬁrm, which is RMB 123 million yuan.
5.2 Regression analysis
Based on Proposition 1, we construct the following regression model:
log(AIijmt) = γ1TFPit + γ2TFP
2
it + β
TXijmt + ǫijmt (15)
where AIijmt is abatement expenditure of ﬁrm i from industry j and province m in year t; TFPit
is ﬁrm i’s productivity in year t; Xijmt is a vector of control variables including capital-labor ratio,
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Observations
Abatement Investment 6637.4 52791.2 4000
Total Fixed Assets 123120.5 990911.6 4000
Employment 560.3 3298.6 4000
Value Added 90753.6 565512.4 4000
Note: Abatement investment, capital expenditure, and value added are in thousand RMB.
number of workers, year dummy, industry dummy, ownership dummy, and province dummy; and
ǫijmt is a random term. The introduction of the productivity square term, TFP 2it, allows us to
capture the possibility of the inverted-U-shape of investment in abatement technology.
Before running the above regression, we need to ﬁrst estimate each ﬁrm’s productivity level.
Following the literature, we estimate ﬁrms’ total factor productivity (TFP). TFP can be esti-
mated in three ways. We ﬁrst use the simple ordinary least square (OLS) regression approach.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that production takes a Cobb-Douglas form with respect to labor and
capital, and then regress the value-added of a ﬁrm on the number of workers (L) and capital
stock (K) it has. The predicted Solow residual is used as the estimate of each ﬁrm’s (the nat-
ural log of) TFP. However, this OLS estimation of TFP may suﬀer from the simultaneity bias
problem. Speciﬁcally, input choices could be endogenously determined by productivity shocks
that are unobservable, which may lead to an upward bias in the estimation coeﬃcients of more
variable inputs, such as capital (Van Biesebroeck, 2007). For this reason, to obtain robust re-
sults, we also use two alternative estimation approaches, namely, panel ﬁxed-eﬀect estimation and
semi-parametric estimation. In semi-parametric estimation, proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003), the Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) method uses the variation in intermediate input to proxy
unobservable productivity shocks, thus reducing the simultaneity problem.
We run regression (15) using three TFP estimates, respectively. The regression results are
reported in Table 2. The ﬁrst two columns report the results using Solow residual as the TFP
measurement; columns (3) and (4) present ﬁndings using the TFP obtained from the panel ﬁxed
eﬀect estimation; and the last two columns present outcomes employing the TFP estimates based
on the LP approach. The qualitative results from all six regressions are the same: the coeﬃcient
of TFPit is positive, whereas the coeﬃcient of TFP
2
it is negative, all statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level.
The positive sign of the TFPit coeﬃcient, γ1, and the negative sign of the TFP
2
it coeﬃcient,
γ2, are necessary but not suﬃcient conditions to prove the inverted-U-shape of the abatement
technology expenditure. They only conﬁrm the concave property of the expenditure as a function
of productivity level. If the domain of TFP is the entire real line, R, i.e., in (0,∞), then they are
also suﬃcient conditions. However, if the domain of TFP is only a subset of R, which is the case
in the present paper, they are not suﬃcient. Following Lind and Mehlum (2010), we proceed to
test additional restrictions. A simple suﬃcient test for inverted-U-shape can be carried out by
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Table 2: Productivity and Investment in Abatement Technology
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS FE FE LP LP
TFP 0.470*** 0.529*** 0.855*** 0.752*** 2.94×10−4*** 2.35×10−4***
(0.014 ) (0.009) (0.085) (0.067) (5.05×10−6) (4.65×10−6 )
TFP 2 -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.093*** -0.066*** -2.69×10−9*** -2.28×10−9***
(7.70×10−4) (4.7×10−4) (0.020) (0.016) (7.24×10−11) (6.34×10−11 )
log(K/L) 0.399*** 0.465*** 0.256***
(0.016) (0.018) ( 0.013)
log(L) 0.989*** 0.949*** 0 .612***
(0.011 ) (0.016) ( 0.014)
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000
R2 0.5133 0.8165 0.3696 0.6140 0.6726 0.7563
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
evaluating the slope of the estimated quadratic curve at the two end points of the data range,
denoted by ϕl and ϕh, respectively. This requires
γ1 + 2 · ϕl · γ2 > 0 and γ1 + 2 · ϕh · γ2 < 0. (16)
We test the above conditions using ordinary F-test. For each of the regressions (from diﬀerent
TFP measures), we calculate the slopes at the two endpoints of the TFP measure and ﬁnd that
they have the correct sign, i.e., positive at ϕl and negative at ϕh. The corresponding F-test also
yields very signiﬁcant results. The results are presented in Table 3. Thus, an inverted-U-shaped
relationship exists between abatement technology investment and productivity level.
To determine if the inverted-U-shape is driven by some outliers, we also redo the test by
excluding observations with the 1% and 5% of the highest TFP ﬁrms, respectively. The inverted-
U-shape is persistent.
As pointed out in the empirical literature on environment and productivity, the causality
may run the opposite direction. That is, investment in abatement technology may in fact aﬀect a
ﬁrm’s TFP.8 This potential endogeneity problem is less serious in our case as we are not claiming
a monotonic relationship between TFP and investment in abatement technology. Given the
diﬃculty in identifying an instrumental variable for TFP, as an alternative, we address this issue
by using one year lagged TFP and lagged TFP squared as the instrument for TFP and TFP
squared. The OLS results, reported in Table 4, show that the inverted-U-shape result is robust
based on TFP estimates from OLS and LP methods. With the ﬁxed-eﬀect TFP estimator, the
parameters of TFP and TFP squared are not statistically signiﬁcant.
8For example, Earnhart and Lizal (2011) found evidence from Czech that good environmental performance
appears to improve proﬁtability by lowering costs. See also Gray (1987).
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Table 3: Testing Inverted-U-Shaped Curve
2γ2ϕl + γ1 2γ2ϕh + γ1
TFP estimated by OLS, control for KL ratio 0.469*** -0.585***
(1122.32) (198.88)
TFP estimated by OLS, control for employment 0.528*** -0.606***
(3807.81) (566.70)
TFP estimated by FE, control for KL ratio 0.838*** -0.600**
(104.59) (6.19)
TFP estimated by FE, control for employment 0.739*** -0.283
(133.25) (2.25)
TFP estimated by LP, control for KL ratio 2.94× 10−4*** -3.71× 10−4***
(3384.93) (718.07)
TFP estimated by LP, control for employment 2.35×10−4*** -3.29× 10−4***
(2551.54) (756.17)
F-statistics in parentheses.All F-statatistics are with degree of freedom of (13,946)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Productivity and Investment in Abatement Technology: Lagged TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS FE FE LP LP
lagTFP 0.434*** 0.480*** 0.167 0.083 3.47×10−4*** 2.80×10−4***
(0.017 ) (0.011) (1.03) (0.129) ( 7.19×10−6) ( 6.46×10−6 )
lagTFP 2 -0.014*** -0.015*** 0.031 0.038 -4.02×10−9*** -3.52×10−9***
( 0.001) (0.0006) (0.020) (0.045) (1.26×10−10) ( 1.09×10−10 )
log(K/L) 0.390*** 0.477*** 0.245***
(0.013) (0.020) (0.015)
log(L) 0.955*** 0.947*** 0.618***
(0.014 ) (0.018) ( 0.016)
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200
R2 0.4870 0.7729 0.3544 0.5933 0.6639 0.7521
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Productivity and Electricity Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS FE FE LP LP
TFP -0.0280*** -0.0316*** -0.2456*** -0.2463*** -9.44×10−6*** 6.77×10−6***
( 0 .0 0 3 8 ) (0 .0 0 3 8 ) ( 0 .0 1 7 7 ) (0 .0 1 7 6 ) ( 1 .6 7×10−6) ( 1 .7 7×10−6 )
log(K/L) -0.0124 -0.0188*** -0.0072
( 0 .0 0 7 9 ) ( - 0 .0 0 8 ) ( 0 .0 0 8 0 )
log(L) -0.0675*** -0.0603*** -0.038
( 0 .0 0 9 3 ) (0 .0 1 7 6 ) ( 0 .0 3 3 )
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 4000 4000 4000 4000 1900 1900
R2 0.4992 0.5055 0.5157 0.5203 0.4962 0.4985
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5.3 Emission intensity
We now test Proposition 3, which says that the emission intensity of more-productivity ﬁrms is
lower than that of less-productivity ﬁrms. In general, measuring country-level pollution emission
is diﬃculty and the task is even harder at the ﬁrm level. Data are simply not available to us.
Alternatively, we use a ﬁrm’s usage of pollution generating inputs as a proxy for its pollution
emission. Although not a perfect measure of pollution emission, it is consistent with our model
in which a ﬁrm’s pollution emission depends on its total input. Note that there are many types
of pollution generating inputs and diﬀerent inputs generate diﬀerent degrees of pollution. Hence,
without a very good conversion matrix, we use a single input, namely electricity, as the proxy
because electricity is the most commonly used input in all ﬁrms. Although using electricity
per se does not generate pollution directly, producing electricity does. As such, the amount of
electricity used by a ﬁrm represents its share of pollution generated from producing electricity in
the economy.
Then, our regressor, namely emission intensity, is the ratio of the electricity usage by a ﬁrm
to the ﬁrm’s total value added, which is inﬂation-adjusted. We regress this emission intensity on
three measures of TFP, respectively, controlling for electricity price and other variables as in the
main regression. Table 5 shows the results. TFP has a clear negative impact on the emission
intensity of the ﬁrms, conﬁrming our theoretical prediction.
6 Conclusion
This paper incorporates pollution emissions (Copeland and Taylor, 2003) and endogenous in-
vestments in abatement technology into a model with ﬁrm heterogeneity in productivity and
endogenous markup (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). The analysis shows how ﬁrms with diﬀerent
productivity levels optimally choose the level of investment in advanced abatement technology. In
particular, we ﬁnd that the incentive to invest in such technology is positively related to the pol-
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lution emission that a ﬁrm generates and takes an inverted-U-shaped curve against productivity.
Nevertheless, more-productive ﬁrms always have lower emission intensity than less-productive
ﬁrms. In response to a rise in pollution tax, less-productive ﬁrms reduce their investment,
whereas more-productive ﬁrms raise their investment.
The present paper demonstrates the theoretical possibility of the inverted-U-shaped invest-
ment in abatement technology, which is supported by China data based on a survey. The result
may not hold for every industry and in every country. It is therefore important to ﬁnd necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for the inverted-U-shape result to hold. Examining the welfare eﬀects
of strengthening environmental regulation and deriving the optimal pollution tax policy are also
worth further investigation. These are left for future research.
More rigorous empirical research should be carried out in future research when richer data
are available. For example, we should employ a more accurate data or estimates of individual
ﬁrms’ pollution emission level in order to have a better test of the relationship between emission
intensity and productivity.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.
From the production function, we have zνx1−ν = q
2
ϕ(1+k) . From (7) and (8) we get
e =
z
q
=
q
ϕ(1 + k)

ν
1− ν
1−ν 
1
τ
1−ν
=

ν
1− ν
1−ν 
1
τ
1−ν
A
2 (bϕ(k + 1) + ρ)
.
We can easily see that ∂e
∂(ϕ(1+k)) < 0. From the expression of optimal k, we have
ϕ(1 + k) = max{ϕ, A
2
√
ϕρ− ρ}.
Thus, d(ϕ(1+k))
dϕ
> 0 except at the non-diﬀerentiable kink point. Thus, ∂e
∂ϕ
< 0.
In fact, we can also show dq
dϕ
> 0. Substituting the expression of optimal k from (10) into q
in (8), we get q = 12b

A
√
ρϕ−2ρ√
ρϕ

for ϕ ∈ (ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗), and q = Aϕ2(bϕ+ρ) for ϕ /∈ (ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗). Both are
increasing functions of ϕ.
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